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Abstract
As one of the measures to smooth income, this paper focuses on the diversiﬁcation of
labor allocation across activities. A key feature of this paper is that it pays particular
attention to diﬀerences in the covariance between weather risk and agricultural wages
and between weather risk and non-agricultural wages. We estimate a multivariate tobit
model of labor allocation using household data from rural areas of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh, India. The regression results show that the share of the oﬀ-farm labor supply
increases with the weather risk, and the increase is much larger in the case of non-
agricultural wage work than in the case of agricultural wage work. Simulation results
based on the regression estimates show that the sectoral diﬀerence is substantial,
implying that empirical and theoretical studies on farmers’ labor supply response to
risk should distinguish between the types of oﬀ-farm work involved.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: Q12, O15, J22.
Keywords: covariate risk, non-farm employment, self-employment, food security, India.
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the eﬀects of weather risk on the oﬀ-farm labor supply of
agricultural households in two Indian states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Despite the
prevalence of poverty, markets for agricultural inputs and outputs are well-developed in
these two states. The development of credit and insurance markets, however, has been
lagging behind (Townsend, 1994; Kochar, 1997). This means that people in general,
and particularly farmers, have few means to hedge against the vagaries of production
and price shocks that may put their livelihood at risk (Fafchamps, 1992; Dercon,
2005). It has long been argued that poor farmers in developing countries attempt to
minimize their exposure to risk by growing their own necessities (Fafchamps, 1992;
Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002), diversifying their activities (Walker and Ryan, 1990;
Kurosaki, 1995), and through other income smoothing measures. If risk avoidance
inhibits gains from specialization and prevents farmers from achieving the output
potential they would be capable of, the provision of eﬃcient insurance mechanisms3 
becomes  highly  important  in  poverty  reduction  policies. 
As  an  example  of  such  ineﬃciency  due  to  risk  avoidance,  we  focus  on  the  labor 
supply  of  farmers  in  developing  countries.  In  the  development  literature,  the  relation­
ship  between  risk  and  labor  market  participation  has  been  analyzed  by  several  authors. 
For  example,  Kochar  (1999)  and  Cameron  and  Worswick  (2003)  examined  the  role  of 
labor  market  participation  as  an  ex  post  risk­coping  mechanism  for  households  hit  by 
idiosyncratic  shocks,  such  as  injury  or  plot­level  crop  failure.  Rose  (2001)  focused  on 
the  role  of  labor  market  participation  both  as  an  ex  ante  and  an  ex  post  response  to 
aggregate  shocks.  She  showed  that  households  facing  a  greater  rainfall  risk  were  more 
likely  to  participate  in  the  labor  market  (ex  ante  response)  and  unexpectedly  bad 
weather  and  low  rainfall  also  increased  labor  market  participation  (ex  post  response). 
Finally,  Townsend  (1994)  showed  that  Indian  villagers  found  it  more  diﬃcult  to  insure 
against  covariate  risk  than  against  idiosyncratic  risk. 
Taking  these  ﬁndings  as  our  point  of  departure,  we  argue  that  in  low­income  de­
veloping  countries  like  India,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  two  types  of  oﬀ­farm  labor 
markets:  agriculture  and  non­agriculture.  Rose’s  (2001)  analysis  simply  considered 
a  single  labor  market,  which,  however,  raises  the  following  problem.  The  covariance 
between  farming  returns  and  agricultural  wages  is  likely  to  be  diﬀerent  from  the  covari­
ance  between  farming  returns  and  non­agricultural wages.  When  an  area  is  hit  by  bad 
weather,  this  may  lead  to  a  decline  not  only  in  a  farmer’s  own  farm  income  but  also 
reduce  the  demand  for  agricultural  labor  outside  the  farm.  In  contrast,  wages  outside 
agriculture  are  likely  to  be  less  correlated  with  own­farm  returns  because  they  are  less 
likely  to  be  aﬀected  by  the  same  kind  of  shocks.  This  line  of  reasoning  suggests  that 
agricultural  households  would  ﬁnd  it  more  attractive  to  engage  in  non­agricultural 
work  as  a  means  of  ex  ante  risk  diversiﬁcation.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  co­
variance  between  wages  and  food  prices  also  matters  (Fafchamps,  1992;  Kurosaki  and 
Fafchamps,  2002;  Kurosaki,  2006).  For  farmers  for  whom  food  security  is  an  issue, 
agricultural  work  may  nevertheless  be  more  attractive  than  non­agricultural  work  if 
agricultural  wages  are  paid  in  kind,  since  the  monetary  value  of  wages  paid  in  paddy 
are  positively  correlated  with  the  paddy  price.  We  show  that  both  of  these  considera­� 
� 
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tions  do  indeed  play  a  role  in  determining  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of  Indian  farmers. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  our  the­
oretical  model  to  explain  how  farmers  decide  to  allocate  their  labor.  The  predictions 
of  the  model  are  tested  using  household  data  from  rural  areas  of  Bihar  and  Uttar 
Pradesh.  The  dataset  is  described  in  Section  3,  while  the  regression  and  simulation 
results  of  a  multivariate  tobit  model  of  labor  allocation  are  presented  in  Section  4. 
Section  5  concludes  the  paper. 
2.  A  Theoretical  Model  of  Labor  Allocation 
In  this  section,  we  extract  the  essence  of  a  theoretical  model  of  Ito  and  Kurosaki  (2006) 
to  guide  our  empirical  analysis.  To  stylize  the  conditions  of  low­income  developing 
countries,  we  assume  that  there  are  only  two  consumption  items:  “food,”  which  is  also 
the  main  output  in  production;  and  “non­food,”  whose  price  is  normalized  at  one.  The 
food  price  is  p  (=  θpp ¯),  where  θp  is  the  multiplicative  price  risk  with  a  mean  of  one. 
¯ For  simplicity,  we  ﬁx  the  total  labor  supply  at  L,  ignoring  the  labor­leisure  choice. 
The  welfare  of  the  household  is  measured  by  its  expected  utility,  E[v(y,p)],  with  the 
properties  vy  >  0,  vp  <  0,  vyy  <  0,  vpp  <  0,  vyp  >  0,  and  vyyy  >  0.  These  properties 
guarantee  that  the  household  behaves  in  a  risk­averse  and  prudent  way  with  respect  to 
income  variability,  suﬀers  if  food  price  variability  is  higher,  and  gains  if  the  correlation 
between  the  food  price  and  income  is  higher  (Kurosaki,  2006).  There  are  three  diﬀerent 
¯ types  of  activity  to  which  the  household  can  allocate  labor  L  (indicated  by  subscript 
j):  own  farming  (j  =  a),  agricultural  wage  work  (j  =  b),  and  non­agricultural  wage 
work  (j  =  c).  Since  the  total  labor  supply  is  ﬁxed,  the  decision  variables  are  the  shares 
of  each  type  of  labor  (�j).  From  each  activity,  the  household  obtains  a  labor  return  of 
¯ θjf(�jL),  where  θj  is  the  multiplicative  risk  at  the  local  level  with  a  mean  of  one,  and 
f(.)  is  a  function  characterizing  the  expected  value  of  the  labor  return. 
Thus,  the  household’s  optimization  problem  is  to  maximize  E[v(y,p, Xp)]  with 
¯ respect  to  �j  subject  to  the  budget  constraint  y  =  y0  +  j  θjfj(�jL,Xw),  the  time 
X
constraint  j  �j  =  1,  and  the  non­negativity  conditions  for  �j,  j  =  a, b, c.  Xp  and 
w  are  vectors  of  household  characteristics:  Xp  includes  shifters  of  preferences  with �

�  � 
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respect  to  risk  exposure  and  food  subsistence  needs,  while  Xw  includes  shifters  of 
household  members’  productivity,  such  as  land,  ﬁxed  capital,  and  human  capital. 
The  ﬁrst  order  conditions  for  the  interior  solution  to  this  optimization  problem 
are  as  follows: 
∂fj  ∂fk E[vyθj] =  E[vyθk]  , j  =  k,  (1)
∂L  ∂L
�
¯ where  ∂fj/∂L  =  ∂fj/∂(�jL).  Applying  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  (1),  we  obtain 
the  reduced­form  solution  as 
∗ 
j  =
�j(¯ L,Xp,Xw,Σ),  j  =  a, b,c,  (2)

where  Σ  is  the  covariance  matrix  of  θa,  θb,  θc,  and  θp.  When  θa  and  θb  are positively 
correlated  but  θc  is  uncorrelated  with  θa,  θb,  and  θp,  we  can  derive  our  empirically 
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where  σa  is  the  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  θa  and  ρp  is  the  coeﬃcient  of  correlation 
between  θb  and  θp.  The  derivation  of  these  results  is  given  by  Ito  and  Kurosaki  (2006). 
The  ﬁrst  relation  in  (3)  implies  that  the  own­farm  labor  supply  declines  as  pro­
duction  becomes  riskier.  However,  the  alternatives  to  own­farm  work  are  not  homo­
geneous.  The  second  and  third  relations  in  (3)  imply  that  it  is  non­agricultural  wage 
work  that  absorbs  a  larger  share  of  the  displaced  labor.  Thus,  we  can  empirically  test 
whether  an  increase  in  σa  raises  the  non­agricultural  wage  work  share  more  than  it 
raises  the  agricultural  wage  work  share. 
The  last  relation  in  (3)  shows  that  the  attractiveness  of  non­agricultural  work 
relative  to  agricultural  work  declines  when  the  correlation  between  the  agricultural 
wage  and  the  food  price  becomes  positive.  This  reﬂects  household  considerations  of 
food  security,  which  is  analyzed  by  Fafchamps  (1992).  Since  wages  are  usually  rigid, 
the  correlation  is  expected  to  be  close  to  zero  when  the  agricultural  wage  is  paid  in 
cash,  while  it  is  expected  to  be  positive  when  the  wage  is  paid  in  kind  (Kurosaki,  2006). 
Thus,  as  an  empirically  veriﬁable  prediction,  we  test  whether  the  positive  eﬀect  of  σa 
on  the  non­agricultural  wage  work  share  declines  relative  to  that  on  the  agricultural 
wage  work  share  when  the  agricultural  wage  is  paid  in  kind. 6 
3.  Data 
In  the  empirical  part  of  this  paper,  we  use  data  on  agricultural  households  obtained 
from  the  Survey  of  Living  Conditions,  Uttar  Pradesh  and  Bihar,  which  is  one  of  the 
Living  Standard  Measurement  Study  (LSMS)  surveys.  Uttar  Pradesh  (UP)  and  Bihar 
are  located  in  North  India  and  are  known  for  their  high  incidence  of  poverty.  Infor­
mation  on  working  days  per  month  and  average  working  hours  per  day  is  available  for 
each  household  member  from  January  1997  to  December  1997. From  this  information, 
we  compile  the  household­level  data  on  the  amount  of  labor  allocated  to  each  of  the  fol­
lowing  four  activities:  (a)  self­employment  in  agriculture,  (b)  wage  work  in  agriculture, 
(c)  wage  work  in  non­agriculture,  and  (d)  self­employment  in  non­agriculture. 
Based  on  these  four  activities,  we  divide  patterns  of  labor  allocation  into  ﬁve 
categories  (Table  1).  Among  the  ﬁve,  category  A,  households  relying  on  self­employed 
work  only,  make  up  the  largest  group,  accounting  for  41.4%  of  the  total,  followed 
by  households  that  combine  own  farming  with  wage  work  (pattern  C,  36.3%).  Yet, 
oﬀ­farm  labor  is  clearly  important  for  agricultural  households:  58.6%  of  households 
had  one  or  more  family  members  that  were  engaged  in  wage  work  in  agriculture  or 
non­agriculture  (‘Including  (b)  or  (c)’  in  the  table).  The  table  also  shows  that  work 
in  non­agriculture  was  more  frequent  than  work  in  agriculture. 
The  lower  half  of  Table  1  shows  that  farm  households  with  income  sources  other 
than  own  farming  have  less  land  and  more  household  members.  For  households  with 
only  small  landholdings  relative  to  the  number  of  household  members,  it  is  diﬃcult 
to  make  a  living  based  on  farming  alone.  Such  households  consequently  allocate  more 
labor  to  oﬀ­farm  work.  The  column  titled  ‘Annual  labor  supply’  in  Table  1  also 
shows  that  pure  farm  households  (‘(a)  only’)  supply  the  smallest  amount  of  labor  per 
household.  The  smaller  labor  supply  of  these  farm  households  indicates  that  their 
reservation  wage  is  higher  than  that  of  other  households. 
Summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  in  the  regression  analysis  are  presented 
in  Table  2.  The  dependent  variables  are  the  shares  of  the  four  diﬀerent  types  of  work. 
Since  the  four  shares  add  up  to  100%  by  deﬁnition,  we  drop  the  last  category  in  the 7 
regression  analysis. 
Adopting  a  reduced­form  approach,  we  regress  the  three  dependent  variables  on 
household  characteristics  (X)  and  aggregate  risk  factors  (σa  and  ρb).  In  the  theoreti­
cal  discussion  above,  we  distinguished  between  two  types  of  household  characteristics: 
those  aﬀecting  households’  preferences  (Xp)  and  those  aﬀecting  household  members’ 
productivity  (Xw).  However,  in  the  reduced­form  approach,  it  is  diﬃcult  to  clearly 
assign  each  X  either  to  Xp  or  to  Xw. For  instance,  the  size  of  a  household’s  landhold­
ings,  credit  status,  the  number  of  working  household  members,  and  their  educational 
attainment  may  aﬀect  both  the  household’s  preferences  and  household  members’  pro­
ductivity.  Therefore,  we  do  not  attempt  to  clearly  assign  each  of  these  variables  either 
to  Xp  or  to  Xw  but  treat  these  variables  as  those  controlling  for  Xp  and  Xw  jointly. 
ρ
Controlling  for  X,  we  test  the  prediction  from  Section  2  with  respect  to  σa  and 
b  using  a  basic  and  an  extended  model.  As  aggregate  risk  factors,  ideally,  we  should 
include  not  only  σa,  but  also  the  full  covariance  matrix  of  shocks  to  oﬀ­farm wages  and 
food  prices.  Due  to  data  constraints,  this  is  left  for  future  research.  As  a  proxy  for  the 
coeﬃcient  of  variation  of  production  shocks,  the  district­level  coeﬃcient  of  variation  of 
annual  rainfall  (CV  rainfal l)  is  employed  in  both  models.1  Two  further  variables  are 
included  that  capture  aggregate  risk  factors.  One  is  Rainfal l  shock,  which  is  intended 
to  capture  the  ex post  response  of  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  to  production  shocks.  We 
would  expect  a  positive  coeﬃcient  on  this  variable  if  households  increase  their  oﬀ­farm 
labor  supply  primarily  as  a  result  of  a  failure  in  rainfall.  The  other  variable  we  include 
is  Irrig  village,  which  is  a  village­level  irrigation  indicator.  Since  we  already  control 
for  the  productivity  increase  in  own  farming  thanks  to  irrigation  by  including  Irrig  hh 
(the  household­level  irrigation  ratio),  we  expect  the  additional  variable  Irrig  village  to 
capture  the  impact  of  irrigation  in  reducing  the  village­level  production  risk.  In  the 
extended  model,  the  variable  Kindshare  (the  village­level  ratio  of  agricultural  wages 
paid  in  kind)  is  calculated  and  its  cross­term  with  CV  rainfal l  is  included  as  a  proxy 
for  the  correlation  between  the  food  price  and  agricultural  wage  shocks. 
1See  Ito  and  Kurosaki  (2006).  They  show  that  the  variation  of  rainfall  is  a  relevant  proxy  because 
the  deviation  of  rainfall  in  a  district  in  a  year  from  its  yearly  average  precisely  predicts  the  deviation 
of  the  agricultural  production  in  the  district. 8 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Determinants  of  Oﬀ­Farm  Labor  Supply 
To  estimate  the  determinants  of  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply,  we  employ  a  multivariate  tobit 
model,  since  there  are  three  dependent  variables,  all  of  which  are  censored  at  zero. 
The  regression  results  are  reported  in  Table  3. 
Among  household  characteristics,  Land  own,  Irrig  hh,  Capital  agri,  and  Livestock 
have  a  positive  eﬀect  on  the  on­farm  labor  supply  (�a)  and  a  negative  eﬀect  on  the 
oﬀ­farm  supply  (�b  and  �c).  Since  all  of  these  variables  raise  the  productivity  of  own 
farming,  they  mainly  correspond  to  Xw  (productivity  shifters).  In  addition,  in  the 
context  of  rural  India,  these  variables  are  also  indicators  of  wealth,  which  may  reduce 
households’  risk  aversion  (Kurosaki  and  Fafchamps,  2002).  Thus,  to  some  extent, 
these  variables  also  correspond  to  Xp  (preferences  shifters). 
Turning  to  the  variable  of  interest,  CV  rainfal l,  we  ﬁnd  that  this  has  a  signiﬁcant 
negative  impact  on  the  on­farm  labor  supply  (�a),  conﬁrming  the  ﬁrst  theoretical  pre­
diction  of  (3).  In  contrast,  both  �b  and  �c  increase  with  CV  rainfal l,  but  the  magnitude 
of  the  increase  is  much  larger  for  �c,  oﬀ­farm  non­agricultural  work.  Thus,  the  second 
and  third  theoretical  predictions  of  (3)  are  also  conﬁrmed.  Agricultural  households 
facing  a  greater  weather  risk  tend  to  divert  more  labor  to  oﬀ­farm  work,  mainly  in 
non­agriculture.  In  contrast,  while  weather  risk  (CV  rainfal l) has  a  signiﬁcant  impact, 
weather  shocks  do  not:  the  coeﬃcient  on  Rainfal l  shock  is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant, 
although  it  is  positive  in  the  regressions  for  both  �b  and  �c.  Our  results  are  thus 
slightly  diﬀerent  from  Rose’s  result  (2001)  that  weather  shocks  signiﬁcantly  increase 
the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply.  The  coeﬃcient  on  Irrig  village  is  signiﬁcantly  negative  in 
the  regression  for  �c,  indicating  that  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of  farm  households 
is  smaller  in  villages  with  more  stable  farming  production.  From  these  results,  we 
conclude  that  oﬀ­farm  labor  in  the  study  region  serves  more  as  an  ex  ante  income 
diversifying  measure  than  as  an  ex  post  measure. 
In  order  to  examine  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  try  out  various  alterna­
tive  speciﬁcations  (Table  4).  First,  the  OLS  results  remain  qualitatively  unchanged,
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although  the  slope  of  CV  rainfal l  becomes  smaller.  Second,  to  test  the  last  predic­
tion  of  (3)  that  the  attractiveness  of  non­agricultural  work  relative  to  agricultural 
work  declines  when  the  correlation  between  the  food  price  and  agricultural  wages  be­
comes  positive,  an  interaction  term  between  CV  rainfal l  and  Kindshare  is  added  in 
the  extended  model.  To  facilitate  the  interpretation  of  the  coeﬃcients,  Kindshare  is 
diﬀerenced  from  its  mean.  The  inclusion  of  the  cross­term  does  not  aﬀect  the  sig­
niﬁcance  of  the  coeﬃcient  on  CV  rainfal l  while  the  coeﬃcient  on  the  cross­term  is 
signiﬁcantly  positive  in  the  regression  for  �b.  Therefore,  when  agricultural  wages  are 
paid  in  kind,  the  attractiveness  of  non­agricultural  work  relative  to  agricultural  work 
declines  among  the  sample  households,  as  predicted  theoretically. 
4.2.  A  Simulation  of  the  Impact  of  Weather  Risk 
In  order  to  examine  the  economic  signiﬁcance  of  the  eﬀect  of  weather  risk  on  oﬀ­farm 
labor  supply,  we  run  simulation  exercises.  First,  to  compare  our  results  with  those  of 
Rose  (2001),  the  probability  of  wage  labor  market  participation  is  simulated.  Since 
the  probability  is  not  readily  available  from  the  multivariate  tobit  model  adopted 
in  this  paper,  we  employ  the  procedure  proposed  by  Cornick  et  al.  (1994)  and  run 
Monte­Carlo  simulations.  Table  5  reports  our  simulation  results.  Despite  the  diﬀer­
ence  in  methodology  and  data,  our  simulation  results  with  respect  to  oﬀ­farm  work 
(agricultural  and  non­agricultural  work  pooled;  last  column)  are  qualitatively  similar 
to  those  obtained  by  Rose  (2001).2  Our  results  indicate  that,  when  the  weather  risk 
increases (CV  rainfal l  increases  from  its  minimum  to  its  maximum),  the  percentage 
of  households  participating  in  oﬀ­farm  wage  work  increases  from  65%  to  73%.  Both 
ﬁgures  are  larger  than  those  obtained  by  Rose  (2001),  but  the  direction  of  change  is 
the  same.  However,  our  research  approach  allows  us  to  go  further  and  decompose 
this  response  into  agricultural  and  non­agricultural  labor  markets.  Doing  so  indicates 
that  agricultural  work  increases  by  only  0.7  percentage  points,  but  non­agricultural 
2Rose  (2001)  estimated  a  random  eﬀects  probit  model  using  a  dummy  variable  for  wage  work 
participation  as  the  dependent  variable.  Thus,  her  estimation  results  readily  provide  the  ﬁgures  for 
Table  5  without  the  need  for  Monte­Carlo  simulations.  In  addition,  she  used  three­year  panel  data 
of  2,115  households  spanning  13  states  of  India  in  1968/69  ­ 1970/71. 10 
work  increases  by  6.5  percentage  points.  The  impact  of  weather  risk  on  oﬀ­farm  labor 
participation  is  thus  very  diﬀerent  across  sectors. 
�
In  the  lower  half  of  Table  5,  we  report  simulation  results  of  the  expected  changes 
in  labor  supply  shares.  The  ﬁrst  four  rows  provide  the  response  of  �j  conditional  on 
j  >  0,  which  is  a  more  correct  measure  of  marginal  changes  in  labor  supply  induced 
by  an  increase  in  weather  risk.  In  the  last  four  rows,  the  unconditional  response  of  �j  is 
shown,  which  is  a  more  useful  measure  to  predict  total  changes  in  the  sample  when  the 
weather  risk  becomes  more  severe.  Both  show  that  the  labor  share  allocated  to  oﬀ­farm 
work  increases  with  the  increase  in  CV  rainfal l  and  the  response  of  non­agricultural 
wage  work  is  more  substantial.  These  results  thus  conﬁrm  that  oﬀ­farm  work  in  the 
non­agricultural  sector  plays  an  important  role  in  diversifying  farm  production  risk. 
5.  Conclusion 
This  paper  investigated  the  eﬀects  of  weather  risk  on  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  of  agri­
cultural  households  in  India.  We  tested  the  theoretical  predictions  that  the  impact  of 
weather  risk  on  the  oﬀ­farm  labor  supply  is  larger  in  the  case  of  non­agricultural  than 
agricultural  wage  work  because  agricultural  wages  are  likely  to  be  more  positively  cor­
related  with  own  farm  income  than  non­agricultural  wages,  and  that,  if  agricultural 
wages  are  paid  in  kind,  the  attractiveness  of  non­agricultural  wage  work  decreases 
relative  to  agricultural  work  due  to  food  security  concerns  on  the  part  of  poor  farm­
ers.  These  predictions  were  conﬁrmed  by  regression  analyses  using  household  data 
from  rural  areas  of  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh,  India.  Simulation  results  based  on  the 
regression  estimates  showed  that  the  sectoral  diﬀerence  is  substantial. 
These  results  imply  that  risk  avoidance  inhibits  gains  from  specialization  and 
prevents  farmers  from  achieving  their  output  potential.  Therefore,  a  crucial  measure 
to  reduce  poverty  in  the  study  region  would  be  to  provide  more  eﬃcient  insurance 
mechanisms.  This  study  shows  that  labor  markets  potentially  play  a  role  in  reducing 
households’  vulnerability  to  risk.  If  labor  markets  are  used  as  an  income  diversifying 
measure,  it  is  critically  important  to  promote  sectors  whose  wages  are  less  correlated 
with  farm  production  shocks. 11 
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Table  1:  Labor  Allocation  Patterns  in  Bihar  and  Uttar  Pradesh,  India

I.  Labor  allocation  patterns(1) 
Pattern  No.  Freq.  Pattern  No.  Freq. 
A)  Self­employment  only  D)  Self­emp.  non­agric.  and  wage  work

(a)  only  354  21.2%  (b)  and  (d)  13  0.8% 
(d)  only  16  1.0%  (c)  and  (d)  12  0.7% 
(a)  and  (d)  322  19.3%  (b),  (c),  and  (d)  13  0.8% 
A)  Sub­total  692  41.4%  D)  Sub­total  38  2.3%

B)  Wage  work  only  E)  Other 
(b)  only  29  1.7%  (a),  (b),  and  (d)  40  2.4% 
(c)  only  38  2.3%  (a),  (c),  and  (d)  123  7.4% 
(b)  and  (c)  29  1.7%  (a),(b),(c),(d)  74  4.4% 
B)  Sub­total  96  5.7%  E)  Sub­total  237  14.2%

C)  Self­emp.  agric.  and  wage  work  Including  (a)  1520  91.0%

(a)  and  (b)  90  5.4%  Including  (b)  473  28.3%

(a)  and  (c)  332  19.9%  Including  (c)  806  48.3%

(a),  (b),  and  (c)  185  11.1%  Including  (b)  or  (c)  978  58.6%

C)  Sub­total  607  36.3%  Grand  total  (A­E)  1670  100%

II.  Household  characteristics  by  labor  allocation  pattern 
No.  of  Lower  Annual  labor  No.  of  working 
obs.  caste(2)  (%)  supply(2)  (hrs)  members(2) 
(a)  only  354  67.51  1910.10  1.84 
(a)  and  (c)  332  72.59  3547.81  2.56 
(a)  and  (d)  322  73.60  3391.59  2.34 
(a),  (b),  and  (c)  185  95.14  3672.14  2.85 
No.  of  No.  of  Size  of  farmland 
working  age  non­working  owned  by  the 
members(3)  age  mem.(2)  household  (acres) 
Total  3.60  3.06  2.71 
(a)  only  3.21  2.56  4.51 
(a)  and  (c)  4.10  3.04  2.59 
(a)  and  (d)  3.81  3.41  2.87 
(a),  (b),  and  (c)  3.24  3.19  1.18 
Notes:  (1)  (a)  =  Self­employment  in  agriculture;  (b)  =  Wage  work  in  agriculture;  (c)  = 
Wage  work  in  non­agriculture;  (d)  =  Self­employment  in  non­agriculture. 
(2)  The  share  of  households  belonging  neither  to  a  middle  or  upper  Hindu  caste. 
(3)  The  reported  ﬁgures  are  the  averages  for  all  households.  ‘Annual  labor  supply’  is  the  sum 
of  hours  working  on  own  farm,  hours  supplied  to  wage  work  outside,  and  hours  working  on 
own  non­farm  enterprise.  Working­age  members  are  deﬁned  as  those  aged  between  15  and  60. 13 
Table  2:  Summary  Statistics  of  Regression  Variables

Variable  Unit  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Dependent  variables:  Labor  hour  shares  (�j) 
(a)  Self­emp.,  agriculture  %  44.92  36.13  0  100 
(b)  Wage  work,  agriculture  %  12.39  24.78  0  100 
(c)  Wage  work,  non­agric.  %  25.75  32.44  0  100 
(d)  Self­emp.,  non­agric.  %  16.95  27.96  0  99.37 
Explanatory  variables:  Household  characteristics  (X) 
Land own(1)  acre  2.70  4.71  0  93 
Irrig  hh(1)  %  80.07  32.72  0  100 
Capital  agri  Rs.  7226.82  30493.54  0  373600 
Livestock  Rs.  7183.27  9545.76  0  150000 
Education(2)  year  3.52  3.60  0  18.5 
Working­age  males(2)  person  1.89  1.17  0  7 
Working­age  females(2)  person  1.72  1.06  0  8 
Non­working­age  members(2)  person  3.06  2.16  0  17 
Dummy  landown(1)  ­ 0.95 
Gross  lending(6)  Rs.  513.36  4752.34  0  150000 
Gross borrowing(6)  Rs.  3833.29  10151.58  0  170000 
Caste  dummies  (‘Upper’  as  the  reference  category) 
Middle  ­ 0.02

Backward  agri  ­ 0.33

Backward  other  ­ 0.18

Scheduled  caste  ­ 0.22

Muslim  upper  ­ 0.04

Muslim  lower  ­ 0.05

Explanatory  variables:  Aggregate  risk  factors  (σa,  ρb) 
CV  rainfall(4)  ­ 0.29  0.07  0.13  0.39 
Rainfall  shock(4)  mm  26.16  64.56  ­57.04  166.89 
Irrig  village(5)  ­ 3.80  1.19  1  5 
Kindshare(3)  ­ 0.159  0.136  0  0.569 
Explanatory  variables:  Other  controls 
UP  state  dummy  ­ 0.61 
Notes:  (1)  The  sample  is  farm  households,  including  pure  tenant  farmers  who  do  not  own 
land.  ‘Land  own’  is  the  size  of  farmland  owned  by  the  household.  ‘Dummy  landown’  is 
based  on  ‘Land  own’.  ‘Irrig  hh’  is  the  size  of  irrigated  land  owned  by  the  household  divided 
by  ‘Land own’. 
(2)  ‘Education’  is  the  average  number  of  schooling  years  among  working­age  adults. 
(3)  In  the  regression,  the  deviation  from  the  mean  is  used. 
(4)  The  coeﬃcient  of  variation  (‘CV  rainfall’)  was  calculated  based  on  ten­year  rainfall  data 
at  the  district  level  (1990­1999).  ‘Rainfall  shock’  was  calculated  as  the  deviation  of  rainfall 
in  1997,  the  year  of  the  LSMS  survey,  from  the  ten­year  average. 
(5)  ‘Irrig  village’  is  an  indicator  variable  based  on  the  village­level  irrigation  ratio  (the  size 
of  irrigated  farmland  divided  by  the  size  of  total  farmland  in  the  village),  taking  1  (0%),  2 
(1­25%),  3  (26­50%),  4  (51­75%),  and  5  (above). 
(6)  Including  informal  credit  from  landlords,  employers,  private  moneylenders,  relatives,  and 
friends. 14 
Table  3:  Determinants  of  Labor  Supply 
(a)  Self­emp.,  (b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work, 
agriculture  agriculture  non­agric. 
Household  characteristics  (X) 
Land  own  1.67  (3.14)***  ­2.93  (3.02)***  ­1.56  (3.84)*** 
Irrig  hh  0.09  (2.72)***  ­0.23  (4.77)***  ­0.01  (0.15) 
Capital  agri/104  0.33  (0.74)  ­1.07  (0.63)  ­1.96  (2.89)*** 
Livestock/104  4.73  (4.15)***  ­2.65  (1.26)  ­5.68  (3.18)*** 
Education  ­0.15  (0.49)  ­3.36  (5.68)***  0.51  (0.96) 
Working­age  males  ­3.83  (4.25)***  ­3.80  (2.40)**  10.05  (6.59)*** 
Working­age  females  ­0.16  (0.15)  ­0.65  (0.34)  1.88  (1.05) 
Non­working­age  mem.  ­1.28  (3.19)***  1.60  (2.10)**  1.21  (1.61) 
Dummy  landown  7.40  (1.86)*  ­13.64  (2.11)**  ­1.93  (0.30) 
Gross  lending/104  ­3.86  (2.83)***  ­33.94  (1.22)  ­6.12  (1.49) 
Gross  borrowing/104  0.002  (0.00)  ­3.38  (1.31)  ­3.65  (1.83)* 
Caste  dummies 
Middle  ­8.05  (1.35)  1.68  (0.10)  ­13.27  (1.09) 
Backward  agri  4.02  (1.26)  23.93  (3.11)***  ­9.71  (1.78)* 
Backward  other  ­10.47  (2.94)***  27.50  (3.47)***  2.11  (0.35) 
Scheduled  caste  ­17.47  (4.95)***  62.04  (8.19)***  2.74  (0.46) 
Muslim  upper  ­9.94  (1.68)*  9.65  (0.82)  3.38  (0.34) 
Muslim  lower  ­23.55  (4.60)***  5.33  (0.46)  ­2.89  (0.31) 
Aggregate  risk  factors  (σa,  ρb) 
CV  rainfall  ­73.11  (5.08)***  2.85  (0.11)  48.06  (2.02)** 
Rainfall  shock/102  1.73  (0.89)  5.40  (1.53)  1.47  (0.42) 
Irrig  village  ­0.30  (0.37)  0.79  (0.58)  ­2.75  (2.09)** 
Other  controls 
UP  state  dummy  ­5.33  (2.06)**  8.25  (1.71)*  18.72  (4.09)*** 
Intercept  65.05  (8.82)***  ­10.25  (0.74)  ­23.91  (1.91)* 
Standard  error  34.16  (63.28)***  47.46  (31.71)***  53.98  (46.96)*** 
Correlation  matrix  1.00  ­0.48  (17.29)***  ­0.61  (34.25)*** 
1.00  0.01  (0.19) 
1.00 
Notes:  (1)  Estimated  using  a  multivariate  tobit  speciﬁcation. 
(2)  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  z­values  based  on  Huber­White  heteroscedasticity­consistent 
standard  errors. 
(3)  No.  of  obs.  =  1654  (To  make  the  estimation  feasible,  16  households  in  Table  1  who 
supplied  labor  to  self­employment  in  non­agriculture  only  were  excluded). 
(4)  Log­likelihood  =  ­15113.26. 
(5)  Likelihood  ratio  tests:  H0  zero  slope:  χ2(63)=  866.46;  H0  all  non­oﬀ­diagonal  elements 
of  the  correlation  matrix  are  zero:  χ2(3)=907.37;  H0  all  three  coeﬃcients  on  ‘CV  rainfall’ 
are  zero:  χ2(3)=  30.90;  H0  all  three  coeﬃcients  on  ‘Rainfall  shock’  are  zero:  χ2(3)=7.42. 15 
Table  4:  Labor  Supply  and  Rainfall  Risk 
(a)  Self­emp.,  (b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work, 
agriculture  agriculture  non­agriculture 
Without  cross  eﬀects,  multivariate  tobit  (Table  3) 
CV  rainfall  ­73.11  (5.08)***  2.85  (0.11)  48.06  (2.02)** 
Rainfall  shock/102  1.73  (0.89)  5.40  (1.53)  1.47  (0.42) 
Without  cross  eﬀects,  OLS 
CV  rainfall  ­62.38  (4.53)***  19.22  (1.94)*  28.96  (2.35)** 
Rainfall  shock/102  1.68  (0.90)  3.29  (2.75)***  ­0.51  (0.29) 
With  cross  eﬀects,  multivariate  tobit 
CV  rainfall  ­74.16  (5.15)***  ­30.77  (1.20)  52.44  (2.18)** 
CV  rainfall*Kindshare  7.19  (0.31)  198.10  (4.76)***  ­27.07  (0.66) 
Rainfall  shock/102  1.57  (0.78)  ­0.02  (0.01)  2.14  (0.59) 
With  cross  eﬀects,  OLS 
CV  rainfall  ­62.55  (4.40)***  12.45  (1.26)  33.36  (2.62)*** 
CV  rainfall*Kindshare  1.21  (0.05)  46.77  (3.19)  ***  ­30.37  (1.50) 
Rainfall  shock/102  1.65  (0.86)  2.19  (1.85)*  0.20  (0.11) 
Notes:  All  four  speciﬁcations  are  estimated  with  other  variables  included,  such  as  household 
characteristics  and  a  dummy  for  Uttar  Pradesh.  Coeﬃcient  estimates  on  these  variables  have 
been  dropped  for  brevity  but  are  available  on  request.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  z­values 
(t­values)  based  on  Huber­White  heteroscedasticity­consistent  standard  errors. �  � 
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Table  5:  Oﬀ­Farm  Labor  Supply  Simulation

A.  Simulation  of  Wage­Labor  Market  Participation 
Wage  work,  Wage  work,  Wage  work, 
agriculture  non­agricul.  any  type 
Pr(�b  >  0)  Pr(�c  >  0)  Pr(�b  +  �c  >  0) 
This  paper 
(a)	 CV  rainfall=0.13(Min.)  0.296  0.455  0.646 
CV  rainfall=0.39(Max.)  0.303  0.570  0.729 
(b)	 Rainfall  shock=­2Std.Dev.  0.258  0.510  0.663 
Rainfall	shock=+2Std.Dev.  0.341  0.546  0.731 
Rose  (2001),  Table  3 
(a)	 CV  rainfall=0.16(Min.)  ­ ­ 0.32 
CV  rainfall=0.91(Max.)  ­ ­ 0.51 
(b)	 Rainfall  shock=­2Std.Dev.  ­ ­ 0.28 
Rainfall  shock=+2Std.Dev.  ­ ­ 0.33 
B.  Simulation  of  Labor  Supply  Shares 
(a)  Self­emp.,	 (b)  Wage  work,  (c)  Wage  work, 
agriculture  agriculture  non­agricul. 
E(�a|�a  >  0)  E(�b|�b  >  0)  E(�c|�c  >  0) 
(a)	 CV  rainfall=0.13(Min.)  60.08  30.45  42.07 
CV  rainfall=0.39(Max.)  46.40  30.65  46.77 
(b)	 Rainfall  shock=­2Std.Dev.  49.88  28.76  44.22 
Rainfall  shock=+2Std.Dev.  53.02  32.54  45.67 
E(�a)  E(�b)  E(�c) 
(a)	 CV  rainfall=0.13(Min.)  51.58  11.33  20.31 
CV  rainfall=0.39(Max.)  35.51  11.51  28.05 
(b)	 Rainfall  shock=­2Std.Dev.  39.66  9.44  23.79 
Rainfall  shock=+2Std.Dev.  43.26  13.75  26.26 
Notes:  E(�j|�j  >  0)  =  Zβj  +  σj
φ(Zβj/σj)  ,  E(�j) =  E(�j �j  >  0)  × Pr(�j  >  0),  where  Φ(Zβj/σj)  |
Pr(�j  >  0)  is  estimated  from  the  upper  portion  of  Table  5.  Simulations  are  based  on  the 
estimation  results  from  Table  3.  See  Ito  and  Kurosaki  (2006)  for  the  full  description  of  these 
simulations. 